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NEW PACT FOR EUROPE – Rebuilding trust through dialogue 
Project description 
Launched in 2013 by the King Baudouin Foundation and the Bertelsmann Stiftung, and supported by a large 
transnational consortium including the Open Society Initiative for Europe (OSIFE), the Calouste Gulbenkian 
Foundation, the European Policy Centre (EPC), the BMW Foundation Herbert Quandt, and the Open Estonia 
Foundation, the New Pact for Europe (NPE) project aims to promote a European wide debate and develop proposals 
on how to reform the European Union in light of the manifold challenges Europe is currently facing. 
After a first successful period in 2013-2015, which included more than 80 events in 17 EU countries and the 
publication of two major reports, which elaborated five strategic options on the future of the EU, the NPE project 
entered a new phase in 2016-2017. The ultimate aim of this new phase of the NPE project is to work out the details 
of a wider ‘package deal’ to equip the EU with the tools it needs to meet the internal and external challenges it faces. 
This proposal will contain solutions generated by connecting the discussions on the key policy challenges, and 
propose changes in the way the EU and its policies are defined to avoid future fundamental crises. 
Building on the analysis and proposals elaborated in the previous phase, the NPE has in this period explored how the 
EU can better serve the interests of its member states and citizens, through a series of 30 national and transnational 
debates on key policy challenges (including the migration/refugee crisis, internal and external security, as well as 
economic and social challenges).  
National Reflection Groups have been created and met specifically for this purpose in ten EU countries (Belgium, 
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Poland, Portugal and Slovakia), followed by transnational exchanges 
between these groups. This national report is the result of the work and discussions of one of these National 
Reflection Groups.  
The discussions within and between representatives of the ten National Reflection Groups will be discussed by a 
European Reflection Group of eminent persons, which includes all the national rapporteurs. It will be tasked to 
produce a final NPE report taking into account the national and transnational debates, scheduled to be published at 
the end of 2017. 
The project also benefits from the overall guidance of an Advisory Group of high-ranking policy-makers, academics, 
NGO representatives and other stakeholders from all over Europe. It is chaired by Herman Van Rompuy, President 
Emeritus of the European Council and former Prime Minister of Belgium. 
For more information on the NPE project, please see the project website: www.newpactforeurope.eu 
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FOREWORD 
 
This report is inspired by the discussions of the Polish National Reflection Group enriched by exchanges with 
National Reflection Groups from Italy and France. It reflects on the ‘state of the Union’ from a national 
perspective and discusses the main challenges the EU and its members are facing, taking into account both 
the European and national perspective. Finally, it proposes ideas and recommendations how the EU and its 
members should react to these main challenges and lays down how the EU and European integration should 
develop in the years to come.  
This paper is part of a series of ten national reports. These reports and the debates in the Member States will 
provide a solid basis for the discussions in the NPE European Reflection Group. The latter will be asked to 
bring the reflection a step further through in-depth and thorough discussions at the European level. The 
Advisory Group chaired by Herman Van Rompuy will provide input to this process. All these reflections will 
lead to a final NPE report analysing the current ‘state of the Union’ and making proposals on how to 
re-energize the European project in the years to come. It will be published at the end of 2017. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Following the 2015 elections, the Polish government has become increasingly disapproving of the current 
state of the European Union (EU); while EU institutions, most notably the Commission, criticised the PiS 
government for infringement of the rule of law and other values and principles enshrined in Article 2 of the 
TEU. The deepening rift between Warsaw and Brussels is accompanied by a deep polarisation of Polish public 
opinion and elites on many crucial issues regarding the future of Europe. These facts notwithstanding, Polish 
society strongly supports Poland’s EU membership and the government’s ‘Brussels bashing’ has had limited 
impact on the general support for integration. 
While distancing itself from both Germany and France, the PiS government sought to build new alliances with 
the United Kingdom and the countries of Central Europe. Brexit and the distinctive interests and perspectives 
among Central Europeans have put this policy in check: the net result is the limitation of Poland’s ability to 
influence the policy agenda in Brussels, including on important issues such as the Posted Workers Directive. 
This report, inspired by the debates of the Polish Reflection Group, differs significantly from the official 
government position in many areas. Unlike the PiS government, the report does not endorse the idea that 
re-nationalising EU powers is an appropriate solution to the European ‘poly-crisis’. On the contrary, it 
recommends that the EU be more engaged in crucial policy areas, such as economic governance, migration 
and security. EU reforms should primarily aim at improving the EU’s ‘performance legitimacy’ rather than 
focus on the perceived ‘democratic deficit’. The report supports improved and more impactful 
communication policies at the European, national and regional levels to address the double challenge of 
populism and Euroscepticism. This report also calls for a pragmatic and results-oriented approach, which 
would focus on reforms within the framework of existing treaties. 
In the areas of institutional reform and economic governance, the report advocates reforms based on 
enhanced cooperation. While “multi-speed Europe” seems unavoidable at this stage, such an initiative must 
not lead to splitting de facto the EU into a semi-permanent ‘core’ and a ‘periphery’. Eurozone reforms are a 
subject of particular concern in Poland. The report calls for these reforms to be implemented within the 
framework of the existing EU institutions and remain open to latecomers, such as Poland. 
In the area of migration policy, the report concludes that the quota-based system of relocation and 
resettlement has led to many negative consequences in a number of member countries, including Poland. 
The system should be replaced with a Common Asylum Policy, which would be financed and managed by 
the EU. Likewise, the report welcomes the establishment of the European Border and Coast Guard Agency 
and advocates that it receives sufficient resources to successfully improve EU border security. Last, but not 
least, the report calls for a long-term migration policy that would reconcile the concerns of the public with 
the needs of European labour markets given the continent’s current demographic trends. 
Finally, regarding matters of security, the report reflects the Polish sensitivity vis-à-vis potential threats from 
a resurgent Russia, while recognising that other EU members, especially Southern Europeans, may have 
different perceptions in this area. It calls for extensive discussion between politicians and experts from 
different member states to bring these differing perceptions closer as a pre-condition for the truly effective 
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and positive development of European foreign and security policies. The report welcomes new initiatives in 
the field of security, such as PESCO or the European Defence Fund, but argues for the complementarity of 
these efforts with NATO commitments, which remain crucial for Europe’s defence. The report also points 
out the heterogeneous character of current security threats, emphasising the need to build up Europe’s 
resilience to cyber threats and propaganda warfare. 
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INTRODUCTION: POLAND AND THE EU 
 
Since the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989, the idea of a ‘return to Europe’ was the 
guiding principles of Poland’s transition to democracy and a market economy. Following the 2004-2007 
enlargement, dynamic economic development, successful absorption of structural funds and record high 
societal support for EU membership lead some to portray Poland as the “best student” in the “class” of 
so-called New Member States (NMS). In 2007, as prime minister, Donald Tusk declared his ambition to make 
Poland a major player in Europe. Working in tandem with foreign minister Radosław Sikorski, the Tusk 
government forged strong ties with Germany, which became Poland’s leading international partner. Tusk’s 
policies allowed Poland to punch above its weight in European politics. The Tusk-Sikorski tandem pushed for 
the EU to deepen its relations with the countries of the former Soviet Union, especially Ukraine, by proposing 
(together with Sweden) the Eastern Partnership policy, arguably the first ambitious proposal supported by 
an NMS to be adopted as EU-wide policy. At the same time, Tusk’s government attempted to improve 
Poland’s relations with Russia during the Medvedev presidency. However, this process withered away 
following Vladimir Putin’s re-election as president. When Russia later occupied parts of Ukraine in 2013, 
Poland was a strong supporter of EU sanctions on Russia to bring it in line with international law.  
Poland was the only EU member state not to fall into recession following the 2008 global financial crisis, 
which strengthened the Civic Platform (PO) government’s international reputation for good economic 
governance. Poland’s successful European integration and foreign policy was acknowledged with the 
appointment of Poles to top jobs in the European institutions, such as the President of the European 
Parliament (Jerzy Buzek) and the President of the European Council (Donald Tusk). Yet, despite large and 
sustained economic growth, highly Europhile attitudes and comparatively low levels of immigration, the 
largest opposition party – Law and Justice, abbreviated as PiS – gained a parliamentary majority in the 2015 
elections.1 The Law and Justice party was elected on generous socioeconomic promises. Its strong adherence 
to identity and sovereignty issues and mutually exclusive alliance with the Polish Catholic Church fuelled its 
resilience after years in opposition as well as a dominant position on the right of the political spectrum. The 
refugee crisis, and especially the European Commission’s controversial policy of mandatory quotas of 
refugees for each member state, spurred a rapid upswing of xenophobia within a few months. The Polish 
brand of populism resembled its Western European right-wing populist counterparts. 
The Law and Justice government also sought to forge new European alliances, stressing the need for strong 
cooperation with Britain and the countries of Central Europe. Despite Brexit, Poland is still calling the UK an 
important partner. This partnership struggles, however, to find meaningful substance. Thus far, it seems 
limited to declarations in favour of deeper cooperation in the field of security and defence. Without London’s 
support, however, Warsaw’s position would be much weaker among other EU partners. On the other hand, 
possible restrictions on the rights of Polish nationals to reside in the UK and post-Brexit cuts to the EU budget 
may adversely affect Poland. 
                                                          
1 Jacek Kucharczyk (ed.), “Poland – When fear wins: causes and consequences of Poland’s populist turn but fear itself?” [In:] S. Gaston, 
P. Harrison-Evans (ed.). Nothing to fear but fear itself: Mapping and responding to the rising culture and politics of fear in the European 
Union, Demos, 2017. 
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The attempt to forge new alliances was accompanied by the gradual, yet clear, deterioration of Poland’s 
relations with Germany. While leading PiS politicians – including Prime Minister Beata Szydło – named 
Germany as Poland’s most important partner, the prevailing PiS discourse stigmatises Berlin as a dangerous 
European hegemon subordinating all EU policies to its national interests. The result is a paradoxical mixture 
of pragmatic cooperation in some fields on the international stage and anti-German rhetoric in the domestic 
arena. Relations with France, previously Poland’s partner within the so-called Weimar Triangle, have also 
deteriorated following Poland’s decision to cancel an important military purchase in 2016. It went from bad 
to worse when, during his presidential campaign, Emmanuel Macron named Poland as one of Europe’s 
budding autocracies, alongside Russia, Turkey and Hungary.2 
In order to balance the Franco-German “domination” of Europe, the PiS government and president Andrzej 
Duda sought to develop regional cooperation in Central Europe within the so-called Visegrad Group and more 
recently, the Three Seas Initiative.3 Solidarity among these new allies was put to the test when earlier in 2017 
the Polish government unsuccessfully tried to block Donald Tusk’s re-election as President of the European 
Council, and was outvoted 27 to one. Poland’s adversarial relationship, not only with Germany and France, 
but with the EU as a whole was later exacerbated by the criticism of the PiS government by both the European 
Parliament and the Commission, for alleged infringement of the values inscribed in Article 2 of the Treaty on 
European Union (TEU), particularly the rule of law. 
  
                                                          
2Reuters, “Poland outraged after Macron comments on Le Pen and Putin”, 2 May 2017, <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-france-
election-poland-russia-idUSKBN17Y1IE>. 
3 Agnieszka Łada, Poland and the EU. Regional Leader or Outlier?, Institute of Public Affairs, Warsaw, 2017. 
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PART 1: THE STATE OF THE UNION. A VIEW 
FROM POLAND 
 
The current Polish national narrative about the state of the European Union (EU) is not easy to monitor due 
to its heterogeneity, which translates into stakeholders voicing diverging arguments about the challenges 
facing the EU. Perception of the EU is thus in a jumble with often radically different opinions, supported by 
PiS government representatives, their political opponents, key opinion-makers, and last but not least, the 
public. While the government and some of its supporters would like to see the integration process partially 
reversed, there is a sustained pro-EU sentiment among the elite opinion leaders, who are backed by vibrant 
pro-European civil society groups. It was mainly the latter that took part in the discussions of the Polish 
National Reflection Group. 
POLISH SOCIETY’S VIEWS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The Polish paradox – the combination of the population’s enduring support for EU membership and the 
government’s relatively strong Eurosceptic rhetoric – requires a rather complex explanation. The general 
appreciation of the benefits of membership goes hand in hand with a growing dissatisfaction with some 
aspects of integration, such as refugee quotas or the adoption of the Euro, both of which are opposed by a 
majority of citizens and can be easily exploited by Law and Justice. 
According to Eurobarometer, Poland is consistently among the top-tier countries where the EU maintains a 
positive image.4 For the past decade, Polish support for membership has not dropped below 70% in the 
national polls. It peaked at 89% in 2014 and remained at 88% in April 2017.5 In a poll conducted prior to the 
60th anniversary of the Treaty of Rome, only 9% of Poles supported a hypothetical withdrawal from the EU.6 
Support for EU membership is not, however, accompanied by public backing for deeper integration. A recent 
study showed that just 14% of Polish respondents wanted the EU’s powers to be increased.7 On the other 
hand, when asked differently, only 24% of Polish respondents agreed with the statement that “the 
integration of Europe has gone too far,” while 48% said that “Europe should integrate more.”8 
The Polish public appreciates the benefits of EU membership, such as the free movement of labour, the 
availability of EU funds, strengthened security and a stronger role of Poland in Europe.9 They also want the 
                                                          
4 European Commission, Public opinion in the European Union, Standard Eurobarometer 83, spring 2015; Standard Eurobarometer 
84, autumn 2015.  
5 Jakiej Unii chcą Polacy? [What Union do Poles want?], Komunikat z badań 72, Centre for Public Opinion Research, 2017. 
6 Survey conducted by Kantar Public for “Gazeta Wyborcza” on 23.03.2017, <http://wyborcza.pl/7,75248,21545381,polacy-o-ue-
odrzucamy-polexit-dajemy-unii-prawo-do-interwencji.html>. 
7  Aleksander Fuksiewicz, Globalisation and European integration [In:] Jacek Kucharczyk (ed.), Poland – When fear wins: causes and 
consequences of Poland’s populist turn but fear itself? [In:] S. Gaston, P. Harrison-Evans (ed.). Nothing to fear but fear itself: Mapping 
and responding to the rising culture and politics of fear in the European Union…, Demos, 2017, p. 329. 
8 Jakiej Unii…, op. cit. 
9 B. Roguska, 10 lat członkostwa Polski w Unii Europejskiej [10th Anniversary of Poland’s membership in the European Union], 
Komunikat z badań 52, Centre for Public Opinion Research, 2015.  
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EU to assert a more active role in international affairs, but they do not consider the promotion of rule of law, 
democracy and human rights as priority areas for Poland’s foreign policy.10  
The EU’s migration policy has, however, affected the Polish support for EU membership because this issue in 
Poland is intertwined with the fear of terrorism. Since 2014, support for welcoming refugees has fallen from 
60–70% to 40–45% because immigrants are predominantly presented as a cultural and security threat.11 
When asked specifically about refugees from Muslim countries, 70% of respondents oppose accepting them 
in Poland. Moreover, 65% declared being against accepting refugees even if it meant losing access to EU 
funds.12 In this context, the European Commission’s push to force Central European member states to accept 
refugees on the basis of mandatory quotas has had the adverse side-effect of boosting anti-EU sentiments in 
Poland and other central European countries. They could result in a decrease in public support towards EU 
membership in the long term. 
Another problematic policy area is Poland’s attitude towards the common currency. Recent polls reveal that 
a strong majority of Poles (72%) are against adopting the euro. The high level of support for Poland’s EU 
membership does not translate into support for the euro because the latter is associated with the EU’s 
economic problems.13, This topic thus hardly exists in the Polish public debate and (with some notable 
exceptions) even pro-European politicians avoid talking about adopting the euro in the foreseeable future. 
Finally, despite public endorsement of the EU and the process of globalisation process, PiS’s “sovereignty 
instead of cooperation” rhetoric appears to be resonating within growing segments of the Polish electorate. 
The mixed reactions to the international criticisms of Poland’s recent political developments have made this 
evident. The PiS government-led reforms of the judiciary (and other legislative initiatives) have been criticised 
by both the Council of Europe (Venice Commission) and the European Commission, amongst others. These 
reforms were also debated in the European Parliament. In Poland, during the summer of 2016, large 
demonstrations across the country and in many cities protested against alleged violations of the 
independence of the judiciary. Polish society remains, however, very divided regarding the criticism from 
Brussels. According to a recent opinion poll, 60% of respondents agreed with the statement that the Law and 
Justice government wanted to subjugate the judiciary and seize all of the power for itself. At the same time, 
only 47% agreed that the EU cared about rule of law in Poland, while 53 per cent said that European 
politicians and institutions were biased against the PiS government.14 
In another 2016 poll about the European Commission’s position vis-à-vis the Constitutional Tribunal case, a 
plurality of respondents agreed that the European Commission’s critical opinion about the rule of law in 
                                                          
10  B. Stokes, R. Wike, J. Poushter, Europeans Face the World Divided, Pew Research Center, 
<http://www.pewglobal.org/2016/06/13/europeans-face-the-world-divided/>. 
11 Stosunek Polaków do przyjmowania uchodźców [The attitude of Poles toward acceptance of refugees]. Public Opinion Research 
Centre, 2017. 
12 Oczekiwania pod adresem polskich polityków w związku z kryzysem migracyjnym w UE [Expectations as to Polish politicians’ 
reactions to the migration crisis in the EU], Public Opinion Research Centre, 2017. 
13 Jakiej Unii…, op. cit. 
14 Krajobraz po wetach [Landscape after President’s vetos], CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre,  
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Poland was justified: 42 per cent agreed whereas 34 per cent thought it was unjustified. These opinions were 
clearly correlated with political preferences (Law and Justice voters disagreed).15 
Thus, the Pole’s diverging views about European integration echo the profound political polarisation of Polish 
society as a whole. These perceptions are affected by opposing arguments on the challenges facing the EU, 
and most notably by the narratives of the ruling Law and Justice party. 
LAW AND JUSTICE’S OPINION ON THE STATE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
The ruling party’s official narrative about the European Union has been greatly shaped by domestic 
considerations. To a large extent, it can be seen as a backlash against EU criticism of the government’s 
attempts to dismantle democratic checks and balances, including by taking political control over the 
Constitutional Tribunal. Poland has implemented the biggest shift in its foreign and European policy since the 
beginning of its democratic transition. For the first time in over two decades, in the narrative of the ruling 
party, European integration is presented as a threat, not as an opportunity. 
According to this official narrative, the EU is led by elites who are failing to listen to the concerns voiced not 
only by citizens, but also – and more importantly – by member states. Brexit is shown as an example of a justified 
rebellion against the tyranny of the EU, which (as they claim) has refused to address legitimate British concerns. 
The European Commission’s attempts to address the problem of the rule of law in Poland have served as 
evidence of the EU’s progressing encroachment on national sovereignty in the eyes of the ruling party. 
Additionally, government-controlled media have described the President of the European Council, Donald 
Tusk – a long-standing political rival of Poland’s de facto leader Jarosław Kaczyński – as a “German candidate” 
who had been elected thanks to German pressure on other member states.  
In 2016 Polish political leaders called for a revision of the EU’s institutional framework to strengthen national 
parliaments and weaken the European Commission, but this idea was later seemingly abandoned. 
Nevertheless, the Polish government has been opposed to the notion of deeper European integration, even 
for a select group of countries. On the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Rome Treaties, the government 
threatened not to sign the Rome Declaration because of its references to a multi-speed integration 
(it eventually signed the declaration).  
The Polish government has vehemently refused to accept refugees from Muslim countries under the current 
or any future mandatory quota schemes. In the eyes of PiS politicians, the EU refugee relocation and 
resettlement scheme had been imposed by the German government, who was attempting to spread the 
costs after having unilaterally decided to accept thousands of refugees. As mentioned before, this particular 
type of anti-EU and Germany-bashing rhetoric seems to resonate rather well with the public. 
Despite these criticisms of the EU and the lack of a positive narrative on the future of Europe, the idea of a 
so-called “Polexit” is generally rejected in the public discourse. Both Prime Minister Beata Szydło and Poland’s 
de facto leader Jarosław Kaczyński have in recent months denied that Law and Justice intended to withdraw 
                                                          
15  Reakcje społeczne na przyjęcie przez Komisję Europejską opinii o praworządności w Polsce [Public reactions to passing an opinion 
about the rule of law in Poland by the European Commission], CBOS Public Opinion Research Centre, 2017.  
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from the EU. Kaczyński called such suggestions “a lie, manipulation and nothing more.”16 PiS politicians 
nevertheless tend to paint the EU in a bad light and portray the Union as a threat to Polish culture and 
security. According to this narrative, “Brussels elites” are pressuring Poland and other countries into 
accepting refugees in the name of ‘political correctness’, which would – in their view - forbid them from 
considering refugees from Muslim countries as a terrorist threat to Europeans. In the long run, this critical 
narrative and the government’s clashing relationship with EU institutions may lead to a worsening of the EU’s 
image in Poland.  
                                                          
16 Kaczyński: nie chcemy wyjść z Unii [Kaczynski: we do not want to leave the Union], 13.03.2017, <http://www.tvn24.pl>. 
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PART 2: KEY CHALLENGES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE EU 
 
The Polish NRG members broadly agree that “more Europe” should be the answer to the growing concerns of 
European citizens pertaining to globalisation and post-national politics. European integration should not be 
promoted as a means to limit sovereignty, but rather as a solution to outstanding challenges and for the general 
benefit of citizens. In this context, “more Europe” means “a Europe that does more to address citizens’ 
concerns.” To address current challenges, the Polish NRG members thus believe the EU should adopt a 
pragmatic approach that shuns both calls for the re-nationalisation of key policies or major steps towards a 
more federalist EU. Radical institutional changes could prove detrimental to devising common solutions to the 
challenges facing member states and Europe as a whole. One must look beyond the limitations of the EU’s 
multi-level governance and see the possibilities it generates. The Union’s legal-institutional framework is not 
ideal, but it does provide the necessary toolbox for the integration project to overcome the current challenges. 
Most importantly, in light of the Polish government’s current standpoint, NRG members believe that the 
current ”state of the union” does not warrant calls for the reversal of the integration process or the significant 
repatriation of competences back to member states. The debate on the optimal form of governance to 
address present challenges has been overshadowed by concerns about the role of the nation state, wrongly 
defined by Eurosceptic leaders as the exclusive vehicle of sovereignty and democratic governance.  
The repatriation of EU powers back to the nation state would constitute a significant setback for Europe in 
an increasingly multipolar global scene. Following the observations of the President of the European Council, 
Donald Tusk,17 the disintegration of the EU would not lead to the restoration of some fabled full sovereignty 
of its member states, but to their real and factual dependence on great superpowers: the United States, 
Russia and China. Contrary to what populist Eurosceptics claim, staying together is the precondition for 
member states to become fully independent in a competitive multipolar world. The Rome Declaration states 
that if acting individually, member states will be side-lined by global dynamics. Standing together offers the 
best chance to influence them and to defend common interests and values. 
One must nevertheless consider that the success of European integration has come at a price. The relative peace 
and prosperity on the continent as well as accelerating modernisation have raised the expectations of younger 
generations of Europeans. Despite the recent political and economic turbulence, The Polish NRG believes that the 
EU with its huge single market and attractive model of cooperation remains an economic powerhouse and a global 
trendsetter. The EU’s competitive advantage constitutes an important source of its soft power. 
Europe needs a reality check to set aside wishful thinking about future integration. In challenging times, 
however, more prosperity and security can only be delivered through harmonisation and deeper integration 
                                                          
17 United we stand, divided we fall, Letter from President Donald Tusk to the 27 EU heads of state or government on the future of 
the EU before the Malta summit, 31 January 2017, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/01/31/tusk-
letter-future-europe/>. 
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in selected policy areas. Many of the EU’s alleged failures are the result of failed domestic policies that 
national politicians chose to blame on “Europe”. Ironically, the same politicians often jealously guard the 
competences of their national polities, thus preventing the EU from effectively enhancing its ‘performance 
legitimacy’ vis-à-vis citizens. The case of Britain in the run-up to the Brexit referendum constitutes a cruel 
demonstration of the dramatic consequences of irresponsible EU-bashing by national politicians. 
The withdrawal of the UK from the EU is a test to Europe’s integrity and unity. In the negotiations, the EU must 
stand firm in protecting its core values and principles and ensure that observance of EU fundamental freedoms, 
including the free movement of people, is a pre-condition for Britain’s access to the common market. 
ADDRESSING THE POPULIST CHALLENGE 
As Brexit so clearly demonstrates, the rise of anti-European populism across Europe is perhaps the most 
immediate threat to its future. To counter this threat, it is necessary to strengthen the resilience of European 
citizens against political rhetoric full of misconceptions (such as fake news) and to protect common European 
values. The Rome Declaration mentioned that European leaders would make the EU stronger and more 
resilient through even greater unity and solidarity, and respect for common rules. These words must be 
followed by practical actions. 
Those national governments that refuse to follow the values and rules enshrined in the Treaties and the 
acquis should be held responsible for their actions. If peer pressure (naming and shaming) fails to correct 
their behaviour, the EU institutions should consistently use the legal means at their disposal, including the 
provisions of Article 7 of TEU. 
The phenomenon of post-truth politics, as exemplified by the LEAVE campaign before the Brexit referendum, 
is an important aspect of the crisis of democratic politics on both the national and European level. The 
revolution in social communication and the rise of Internet-based media has been compared to the 
‘Gutenberg revolution’, for its potential to drastically change the nature of human interactions and for its 
far-reaching consequences for the political outlook of Europe and beyond. The new media environment has 
provided fertile ground for populist and Eurosceptic politicians. Education and information should become 
the cornerstones of citizen resilience to populism. The promotion of European values, such as the protection 
of human rights and the rule of law, combined with education about the real nature of European integration 
and its symbols are the order of the day for Brussels. 
The ability of populist and Eurosceptic politicians to gain public support is to some extent a result of the 
‘naturalisation’ of the benefits of integration. The predominant technocratic approach to cooperation 
involving limited engagement on the part of citizens in EU policy-making has failed to win their hearts. A 
compelling story is required for younger generations of EU citizens to identify with the European project. 
Having grown up with the reality of European integration, an increasing number of individuals take its 
benefits for granted, while complaining about the real or perceived costs of integration.  
The Polish NRG members also argue that the ubiquitous narrative about the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ should be 
critically re-examined. This discourse has gained in popularity in the aftermath of the currency crisis. Initially, it 
had a neutral connotation and was intended to help put forward interesting ideas about how to increase the 
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involvement of citizens in EU decision-making. Some of these ideas, if implemented, have the potential to bring 
EU institutions closer to citizens and increase a sense of trust and ownership among the public. 
Today, the discourse on the EU’s ‘democratic deficit’ is being successfully used by Eurosceptic populists to blame 
the EU for its lack of democratic accountability and to warrant a retreat from the integration project. The recent 
“referendum-mania” on EU-related (and other) issues (in Greece, the Netherlands, United Kingdom, Hungary, 
etc.) shows that populists can easily hijack some democratic decision-making instruments, such as referenda. 
On the other hand, there is no evidence that referenda can effectively reduce the alleged democratic deficit, 
while they can, in fact, deepen political polarisation and paralyse important EU policies. 
Policy recommendations 
 It is of crucial importance to develop innovative tools that can enhance EU citizens’ 
participation in policy debates and decision-making on a regular basis (including by improving 
available instruments, such as the European Citizen’s Initiative), instead of voting on important 
matters by referendum. More attention should be given to improving the quality of citizens’ 
involvement. 
 The EU urgently needs a well-crafted communication strategy, encompassing the use of new 
information technologies (social media). The strategy should include the promotion of 
European values (such as the protection of human rights and the rule of law, but also tolerance, 
diversity and gender equality).  
 The Eurosceptic narrative in the post-truth era is effective because it promotes emotions over 
facts. As part of the new communication strategy, the EU needs new positive and pro-European 
narratives with recognisable practical symbols (such as European Solidarity Corps or Erasmus). 
If such narratives are not popularised, there is a real danger of Europe reverting to the old tales 
favouring the nation state as the protagonist. This new narrative should clearly portray 
European identity as an added value, not a threat to national identity. 
 Citizens’ education is not a European competence, so Brussels’ ability to act is largely limited. 
It therefore falls on the member states to implement proper EU-related education at schools 
to teach about the nature and history of European integration and its symbols in order to better 
equip youth with knowledge that will increase their resilience to anti-European fake news-
based campaigns in the future. Such activities can be inspired, coordinated and financially 
supported by EU institutions. 
 An effective system for disbursing funds directly to local and national Civil Society 
Organisations (CSOs) and to local and regional governments to bypass (often Eurosceptic) 
national governments has been championed as a worthwhile solution. In particular, a recent 
proposal by a group of prominent European CSOs to establish new European Values 
Instruments should be urgently considered and put into practice. The Europe for Citizens 
Programme of the European Commission as well as the grants from the European Parliament 
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for NGOs and media should be much better funded and the current excessively restrictive 
application and reporting rules should be revised.18  
 The relation between communication technologies and the rise of populism is worth more 
attention (research-wise and politically), and effective ways of bringing back evidence-based 
debate into the political mainstream need to be properly discussed and put to use. 
 
REGAINING PERFORMANCE LEGITIMACY 
The Polish NRG members believe that the current populist backlash against the EU has both socio-cultural 
and socio-economic roots. As a result, any effective countering of the rise of populism must combine 
communication efforts and European value promotion with effective policies improving the situation of the 
most vulnerable groups of European citizens, as well as increasing the benefits of integration (and the 
awareness of such benefits) for the public at large. Regaining ‘performance legitimacy’, that is, demonstrating 
to citizens that the EU can deliver is therefore extremely urgent. The immediate priority concerns the need 
for the EU to address peoples’ economic insecurities as highlighted in the Rome Declaration, which called for 
“a Union which, based on sustainable growth, promotes economic and social progress as well as cohesion 
and convergence, while upholding the integrity of the internal market.” The Polish NRG members believe that 
cohesion policy is a prerequisite for any long-term plan dealing with European challenges. 
Policy recommendations 
 The EU must continue investing in economic development, especially in less-developed 
regions. Europe has to address the economic insecurities of certain groups of citizens. 
Addressing the problem of youth unemployment and other sources of the ‘precarisation’ of 
this social group should be considered one of the most immediate priorities. A common system 
of social security safeguards for the unemployed could mark a potential solution. 
 When addressing social problems affecting some member states (e.g. deindustrialisation), the 
EU should make sure the integrity of the internal market is upheld. The Polish NRG has 
expressed particular concern about some of the solutions proposed during the debate on the 
so-called Posted Workers Directive. 
 Delivering on the expectations for the EU to ensure inclusive economic development will 
require the creation of additional budgetary resources for the EU, such as the financial 
transaction tax. 
                                                          
18For more detailed ideas see: <http://www.eesc.europa.eu/en/our-work/opinions-information-reports/opinions/financing-civil-
society-organizations-eu>. 
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 The EU must not forget to ‘market’ its successful policies – that is, to spread the message about 
the direct benefits of European integration to EU citizens. According to some NRG members, 
the EU should adopt a new approach to communication, based on experience and good 
practices from successful business marketing strategies. The EU institutions should unify their 
communication activities and focus on a single, simple, positive and benefits-oriented message. 
They could use “storytelling” techniques developed in the advertising industry and promote 
the Union as such rather than themselves. It is important for EU communication to be tailored 
to the specific situation and context of each member state.19 
 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS 
The concept of a multi-speed Europe becoming the prevailing model for European integration occupies an 
important place in the on-going debates, and is perceived with strong misgivings in Poland. The Polish 
government and NRG members share the same view on the need to secure the inclusive nature of European 
policies. The 2017 Rome Declaration concludes that the “EU will act together, at different paces and intensity 
where necessary, while moving in the same direction, as it has been done in the past, in line with the Treaties 
and keeping the door open to those who want to join later. Our Union is undivided and indivisible.” However, 
the current discussion demonstrates that there are many interpretations of such statements – not just among 
member states, but also within the member states themselves. 
On the other hand, one can observe that a multi-speed Europe has been the EU’s reality since the early 1990s. 
It enables integration to progress, as proven by the Schengen area or the Eurozone. An integration project 
that prevents ‘coalitions of the willing’ to lead integration efforts will end in stagnation or even disintegration. 
Hence, the alternative to a multi-speed Europe is de facto a speed-less Europe. 
The potential threats of multi-speed integration (i.e. leaving countries such as Poland outside and without 
the possibility of joining new forms of integration) are recognised by both the government and the expert 
community. They constitute one of the few unifying factors in the Polish narrative on the future of Europe. 
The obligations arising from the Lisbon Treaty (article 280) regarding the instrument of enhanced 
co-operation should be respected at all times. Thus, the institutional and policy cohesion of the EU should be 
ensured, and no member states should be excluded from a particular policy area and locked permanently in 
a second tier of European integration. In a situation where Poland cannot join the Eurozone due to political 
and economic reasons, it is particularly important in the Polish debate that deepening the cooperation 
between members of the Eurozone proceeds within existing EU institutions and remains open to countries 
that have thus far not adopted the common currency. 
Beyond doubt, the Eurozone is and will remain the anchor of economic and political integration in Europe. 
Presenting the Eurozone as a mere economic project would be a huge misstep. The monetary union has 
                                                          
19 Konrad Niklewicz, We Need to Talk about the EU. European Political Advertising in the Post-Truth Era, Brussels: Wilfried Martens 
Centre for European Studies, 2017. 
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significant political value for the future of European integration. As a result, Polish NRG members want an 
inclusive Eurozone that will allow non-members to remain active participants in shaping economic policies, 
with an emphasis on the importance of a community approach in economic policy-making. 
As a non-euro member state, Poland has limited capabilities to stir developments within the Eurozone. In the 
context of the calls of President Macron for more integration in the Eurozone, Poland can be further 
marginalised in this crucial debate unless it actively moves towards adopting the common currency. This would 
put Poland at the heart of the integration process and prevent its marginalisation from the policy-making 
process. However, the current government is unwilling to advance Poland’s Eurozone membership. Recently, a 
number of Polish experts and some opposition politicians began calling for a serious discussion over the 
question of whether or not to enter the Eurozone. Most members of the Polish NRG strongly endorse this view. 
Policy recommendations 
 Starting from the discussions in the expert community and continuing with fact-based public 
debate, a clarification must be made regarding the understanding of such concepts as ‘core 
Europe’ and ‘flexible/enhanced cooperation’. The current narrative in the EU often equates 
both terms, signalling a possible rupture in integration between states that are members of 
the core group inside the Eurozone, and those outside of the monetary union. 
 Any initiatives for deeper integration among a group of members should observe the principle 
of inclusiveness as highlighted in the 2017 Rome Declaration, namely “in line with the Treaties 
and keeping the door open to those who want to join later.” 
 Europe does not need to reinvent the wheel. Before any decision introducing new institutions 
(or principles), the EU must make sure the available solutions (instruments at its disposal in the 
current treaty framework) are being utilised to their maximum potential. Legal changes or a 
set of new institutions are to be introduced at the right time, not necessarily as soon as 
possible. 
 More economic integration is necessary for European states to compete with global 
superpowers, although there is no agreement among the EU27 whether further cooperation 
requires an immediate acceleration (e.g. tax harmonisation) or whether it should remain a 
step-by-step process. The Polish NRG tends to agree that such changes need to be introduced 
in a pragmatic and incremental manner. Most importantly, the general public needs to be 
convinced as to the need for such changes before, and not after, they are decided and 
implemented. 
 Brexit should not be an argument for reversing the integration process for the rest of the EU. 
On the contrary, it should be seen as an opportunity for the remaining members to step up 
their cooperation in crucial policy areas, such as economic governance, migration or security.  
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SECURITY POLICY 
The Polish NRG members recognise the importance of EU cooperation in the field of security as one of the 
few policy areas where consensus, both among member states and across the domestic political spectrum, 
can be built. Considering global insecurities and concerns about the transatlantic alliance resulting from 
recent political changes in the US, deepening European cooperation is the order of the day. However, the 
NRG members also agree that progress in this area should be pragmatic to avoid weakening existing security 
arrangements with new initiatives. 
Russia remains the main security challenge for Poland, and NATO is believed to be the only concrete 
protection against a possible military threat from this country. NATO is seen as necessary for the security of 
their country by 91% of Poles, 81% of Hungarians, 75% of Czechs and 56% of Slovaks.20 In the eyes of the 
Poles, the EU has correctly responded to Russian resurgence by imposing sanctions following its annexation 
of Crimea and de facto military occupation of parts of Eastern Ukraine. 
Security is a multifaceted issue and should be approached accordingly. In that regard, the EU should be ready 
to address both dimensions of ‘hard’ security, i.e. the external (military intervention, cyber threats) and 
internal (extremism, terrorism) threats. Polish NRG members agree that NATO should remain the pillar of 
European ‘hard’ security in the short to medium-term perspective. The EU should also consider boosting 
military cooperation in areas where added value to NATO can be demonstrated. 
Another top priority for the EU in the near future is to develop the ability to respond to cyber security threats 
and information warfare. In this context, EU institutions and member states should focus their attention on 
Russia’s continuous use of propaganda and hybrid war tactics to destabilise the EU. The Russian government 
is aggressively employing a wide range of tools and instruments, such as think tanks and special foundations 
(Russkiy Mir), special agencies (Rossotrudnichestvo), multilingual TV stations (RT), pseudo-news agencies and 
multimedia services (Sputnik), as well as cross-border social and religious groups to wage its disinformation 
war. The European Parliament resolution on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda is an 
important step forward.21 However, practical implementation measures need to follow. 
Policy recommendations 
 The EU should continue to strengthen military cooperation among member states. A common 
European army is a solution in the long-term perspective. In the short to medium-term, both 
PESCO and the European Defence Fund should be developed in such a way as to ensure their 
inclusivity and coherence with NATO commitments. 
                                                          
20  Global Attitudes Survey, Pew Research Centre, Spring 2017. 
21 European Parliament resolution of 23 November 2016 on EU strategic communication to counteract propaganda against it by 
third parties (2016/2030(INI)), P8_TA(2016)0441. 
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 Improving the effectiveness of defence spending by developing a true defence market should 
be a priority of European cooperation in the field of security. 
 The military threat from the Russian Federation should not be underestimated. The sanctions 
against Russia must be upheld for as long as Russia continues to occupy (directly or by proxy) 
Crimea and parts of Eastern Ukraine. 
 The EU has to take due account of the multifaceted nature of the security threats. 
Disinformation and propaganda should be given proper attention as security challenges in the 
near future. For that purpose, initiatives such as East StratCom22 should receive sufficient 
human and financial resources.  
 The European Energy Union should also be seen as a response to the broadly understood 
security concerns of some member states, including Poland. The EU should actively address 
economic and political threats resulting from the overdependence of some member states on 
Russia for energy resources. The European Commission should investigate initiatives such as 
NORDSTREAM 2 from that perspective. Facts about energy market in the EU and the 
percentage of gas coming from Russia must be clearly shown to EU citizens to better explain 
the Central and East Europeans concerns. 
 Last, but not least, more debate on security challenges for Europe and mutual understanding 
is needed among the politicians, experts and opinion makers from the different member states. 
In particular, the dual perspective of Eastern and Southern members should be a topic of 
discussion, and the different fears and concerns should be mutually acknowledged and 
reflected in EU-level policy decisions. 
 
MIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY 
Across the European Union, the refugee crisis dominated the political agenda and the public discourse about 
migration issues. Poland was no exception. The scale and speed of the refugee crisis should not, however, 
overshadow the vital importance of enhancing intra-EU mobility and effectively managing migration from 
third-country nationals to boost EU’s economic performance. 
The refugee crisis of 2015 has not affected Poland directly. The country has not welcomed any refugees from 
Northern Africa thus far. The political fallout from the crisis, however, has been significant. In this context, 
the EU decision to establish refugee quotas has resulted in an anti-refugee, nativist and Islamophobic 
backlash. The current government’s policy of refusing to accept any refugees has strong support among the 
public, and threats to sanction Poland for non-compliance appear to strengthen anti-EU sentiments and 
undermine broad public support for membership. Clearly, from a Polish perspective, any system of EU 
                                                          
22 The European External Action Service East Stratcom Task Force was set up to challenge Russia’s ongoing disinformation campaigns. 
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mandated refugee quotas is likely to lead to a negative political outcome. Instead, a newly forged Common 
Asylum Policy – with appropriate budgetary allocations and a set of positive financial and political incentives 
for member states – would have a better chance of being accepted and implemented. 
Recent events have demonstrated that the EU’s external borders need better protection. The Polish NRG 
therefore welcomes the decision to establish a European Border Guard, which should be given sufficient 
resources and powers to convince sceptical Europeans that when it comes to refugees and migration, the EU 
is part of the solution and not part of the problem. 
Last, but not least, in order to enhance general public support for EU migration policy, there is a need for 
smart communication activities regarding EU asylum policies. A bias-free narrative on migration must be 
introduced, explaining the need for the EU and member states to adopt policies in accordance with 
international humanitarian standards. The EU should also communicate why Europe needs qualified migrants 
to meet the future needs of the EU labour market in view of the existing demographic challenges. 
Such information campaigns should be tailored to the specific situation of each member state, taking into 
consideration the differing experiences and sensibilities of the local populace. At the same time, there is a 
need for discussion and the exchange of experiences between the different countries and regions, for 
example, CEE and the Southern EU members. 
Policy recommendations 
 The EU needs to continue to develop community-based institutions and policies to more 
effectively respond to challenges resulting from migration flows, as well as the concerns of the 
general public.  
 To deal with migration flows more effectively, the EU should closely cooperate with third 
countries and international organisations (UN). At the same time, member states should 
significantly increase their contribution to the EU’s development and humanitarian assistance 
programs for third countries most affected by the refugee crisis. 
 Additional resources should be allocated to local authorities willing to adopt more open 
refugee and migration policies than those of their national governments. Similar support 
should be granted to local CSOs with experience in migrant integration and with knowledge 
about the specificity of each county and its public opinion. This is especially needed in Poland, 
where the current government is not willing to support such activities and organisations, and 
has blocked some important funding programmes for political reasons. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This report is an attempt to outline the Polish perspective on the future of Europe. A crucial challenge for the 
authors, as was mentioned earlier in the report, has been the profound polarisation of the Polish political 
debate and a lack of consensus on the most pressing issues facing Poland and Europe. The public debate is 
filled with emotions but often short of arguments. The present report has been written from a clearly 
pro-European viewpoint, reflecting the views of the authors and members of the National Reflection Group. 
We believe that this perspective is legitimate in the light of one crucial fact: a clear majority of Poles supports 
EU membership, while support for a hypothetical “Polexit” remains marginal. Either in government or in the 
opposition, leading Polish politicians have also repeatedly expressed their support for Polish membership 
and their opposition to any British-style discussion about exiting the EU. This broad support for EU 
membership does not preclude many critical opinions about the current state of the Union and almost 
equally numerous, often contradictory, ideas about necessary reforms. 
Poland has not been directly buffeted by many aspects of the EU ‘poly-crisis’, such as the economic recession, 
the debt crisis, the influx of refugees or terrorist attacks. This matter notwithstanding, the poly-crisis has 
impacted Polish perceptions of integration and the debate about the future of Europe. While the public 
remains largely pro-European, on some critical issues (such as adoption of the euro and accepting refugees), 
most Polish politicians and a majority of citizens have refused to fulfil the obligations resulting from EU 
membership. This opposition and recent international and European criticism about the situation of the rule 
of law have undoubtedly weakened Poland’s position in the EU and its ability to effectively promote its 
interests on such issues as the Posted Workers Directive. 
From the Polish perspective, the rise of authoritarian populism is a crucial existential challenge for the EU 
(and for Poland’s place in Europe). A key message from the discussions of the Polish NRG was that to move 
the discussion on the future of Europe forward, politicians and analysts should be wary of adopting the 
language and rhetoric of populists and Eurosceptics in their diagnosis of the nature and causes of the current 
crisis. Polish experts tend to see the current European crisis as a sum of national crises resulting from national 
policy failures and the shortcomings of national democratic institutions and party systems. While some of 
the EU institution reactions to these failures were debatable or may have exacerbated the crises, blaming 
the EU is first and foremost the tactic of unscrupulous politicians seeking to boost their domestic support. 
This habit should not be mistaken with a serious analysis of the state of the EU, and should not form a basis 
for recommendations of policy reforms. 
According to the Polish NRG, the fact that the EU is mistakenly viewed as a reason for the current crisis, and 
not as a possible effective solution to new challenges, is due to an evident problem of communication on 
several levels. Political elites and experts involved in European affairs seem to be short of ideas on how 
European integration should be presented to the new generation of European citizens. This is why this report 
calls for a new communication strategy and a new European narrative to counter the omnipresent 
Eurosceptic and populist narratives. 
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In a rather paradoxical way, the past successes of European integration have become a liability for the EU. 
Having set relatively high socio-economic benchmarks for itself in the past, the EU has in recent years failed 
to demonstrate to Europeans that it can still deliver on their expectations, which have been growing and 
changing over the years. The popular belief is that younger generations of Europeans no longer consider the 
old slogans of “peace, stability and prosperity” as sufficient to embark on further integration. This hypothesis 
should not be taken for granted: as shown in a recent study,23 many young Europeans pay considerable 
attention to peace and security, while needing to be constantly reminded about the merits of integration. 
Nevertheless, new communication strategies and new narratives will not work unless the EU can 
demonstrate it can deliver in the areas where its citizens expect it to act, such as stable economic growth, 
security and migration policy. 
To escape the present conundrum, the EU must develop a new communication prowess. Most importantly, it 
needs to use both existing and new competences to solve the real problems facing citizens and member states. 
This pragmatic and problem-solving orientation should guide the current debates on the future of Europe. 
  
                                                          
23 J. Kucharczyk, A. Łada, G. Schöler (eds.), Exit, voice or loyalty? Young people on Europe and democracy Case studies from Austria, 
the Czech Republic, Germany, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, Institute of Public Affairs, Bertelsmann Stiftung, Warsaw-Gütersloh, 
2017. 
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